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and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
: Category No. 3 
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden of the 




and Cross-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a decision granting in part a 
petition for postconviction relief. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1992) 
because the appeal is from a district court involving a capital 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did trial counsel provide constitutionally 
effective assistance regarding the testimony of Dr. Heinbecker? 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must 
demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that 
the deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are mixed questions of fact and law. State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
2. Did appellate counsel provide constitutionally 
effective assistance? The same standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, a 
capital felony; attempted first degree murder; aggravated 
kidnapping; escape; and possession of a dangerous weapon by an 
incarcerated person and was sentenced to death on October 25, 
1985 (Record [hereafter R.] at 2-3). He appealed his conviction 
and sentence to the Utah Supreme Court which affirmed the 
judgment in State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). His subsequent petition for 
rehearing was denied on November 15, 1989. On April 16, 1990, 
the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of 
certiorari (R. at 3). 
On July 16, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for 
postconviction relief in the state trial court alleging violation 
of his constitutional rights by: 1) use of hypnotically enhanced 
testimony; 2) use of petitioner's inadmissible statements; 3) use 
of excessive security measures; 4) failure to advise petitioner 
of a right to testify; 5) violation of right to presence at 
trial; 6) use of victim impact testimony; 7) insufficient 
evidence of aggravating circumstances; 8) ineffective assistance 
of counsel at trial; 9) ineffective assistance of counsel on 
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appeal; 10) failure to instruct the jury on statutory mitigating 
circumstances; 11) failure to instruct the jury on the burden of 
proof as to the existence of aggravating circumstances; 12) 
consideration of non-statutory aggravating circumstances; 13) 
unconstitutional death penalty scheme; 14) vagueness and 
overbreadth of one of the aggravating circumstances set forth in 
the capital homicide statute; 15) admission at sentencing of any 
probative evidence regardless of the exclusionary rules of 
evidence; and 16) failure to narrow the class of persons eligible 
for the death penalty (R. at 2-19). A motion to stay execution 
was granted on August 8, 1990 (R. at 36). 
Respondent filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
on October 5, 1990 (R. at 87-95). A hearing on the motion was 
conducted on October 12, 1990, at which time petitioner moved to 
amend his petition to include a claim of conflict of interest 
involving his supplemental appellate counsel (R. at 307 and 309-
10). An oral ruling which granted summary judgment in part and 
denied it in part was pronounced at that hearing (R. at 309-10). 
A formal order was signed on June 18, 1992 (R. at 484-85). 
An evidentiary hearing on the remaining issues was 
conducted on November 27-28, 1990> in the Third Judicial District 
Court, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, district judge, presiding 
(R. at 359 and 366-67). In a memorandum decision issued July 26, 
1991, the court denied in part and granted in part the 
postconviction petition (R. at 487-520). Respondent filed a 
motion for new trial on August 5, 1991, which was denied on 
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October 7, 1991 (R. at 521 and 530). Respondent then filed this 
appeal (R. at 532-33) and petitioner filed a cross-appeal (R. at 
536-37). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The trial court granted the petitioner's writ on two 
issues: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel at trial regarding 
Dr. Heinbecker's testimony; and 2) ineffective assistance on 
appeal. This fact statement will only address those issues. 
A. Trial issue - Dr. Heinbecker's testimony. 
On April 2, 1985, petitioner shot and killed an 
attorney in the basement of the Third District Court building (R. 
at 564). Andrew Valdez and James Valdez of Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association were appointed to represent petitioner (T. 
at 616). Five weeks after the murder, on May 10, 1985, at the 
request of petitioner's trial counsel, Dr. Mark Rindflesh 
examined petitioner for the purpose of exploring a psychological 
defense at trial (R. at 618, 658 and 774). At the evidentiary 
hearing on this petition, Dr. Rindflesh did not recall having had 
access to any records regarding petitioner's history (R. at 776), 
although petitioner's records from the state hospital and the 
reform school were subpoenaed by petitioner's trial counsel (R. 
at 659). Dr« Rindflesh spent an hour and a half interviewing 
petitioner but was not called to testify at trial (R. at 773-74 
and 777). Trial counsel did not call him to testify because his 
testimony would be more harmful than helpful (R. at 758). Dr. 
Rindflesh told counsel that petitioner had no "significant 
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psychiatric disorders" but "that textbooks are written about 
people like [petitioner], who basically have compulsive 
behavioral problems" (R. at 719-20). 
Both pretrial and during trial, counsel continued to 
search for a psychological examiner who could bolster 
petitioner's case. Counsel reviewed a psychological evaluation 
conducted at the prison by Dr. LaPray which included a battery of 
tests (R. at 660). Counsel met with Dr. Agnes Plenk, but she 
declined to be involved in the case (R. at 660-61 and 797). They 
also approached another doctor, possibly Dr. Lebegue; however, 
this doctor also declined to participate (R. at 662). Counsel 
kept looking for an expert who would give a "different conclusion 
other than a sociopath compulsive behavior, [which] is what 
people were telling [counsel]" (R. at 662, 714-20 and 742). "It 
wasn't a question of not calling [to find an expert]. It was a 
question of getting some kind of favorable diagnosis." (R. at 
666). Counsel sought to have the evaluations done in such a way 
that the State would not have access to the results because they 
were so unfavorable (R. at 740-42 and 759). 
Counsel had difficulty finding anyone who would 
associate with the case until they found Dr. Heinbecker, "late in 
the case" (R. at 662). Dr. Heinbecker was new in the state and 
even he originally declined to be involved (R. at 721 and 714). 
Dr. Heinbecker had only 24 hours notice before he was called to 
testify for petitioner at the penalty phase of his trial (R. at 
750 and 671). He would have expected and preferred to have had 
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more time to prepare (R. at 754 and 721). Counsel did not ask 
for a continuance to allow more preparation because they knew 
"that it wouldn't have been continued. Just the nature of the 
case as it was going, the judge we had." (R. at 721). Counsel 
debated about even calling Dr. Heinbecker because his testimony 
had both favorable and unfavorable components (R. at 666 and 713-
14). 
Once counsel contacted Dr. Heinbecker and overcame his 
reluctance to participate (R. at 714), Dr. Heinbecker interviewed 
petitioner and petitioner's mother and brother (R. at 750-52). 
He also reviewed documents, including records of psychological 
testing of petitioner done at the prison (R. at 750, 752 and 
755). At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Heinbecker agreed with 
petitioner's counsel that it would have been "helpful" in 
formulating his diagnosis to have administered some tests to 
determine whether petitioner suffered from organic brain syndrome 
(R. at 754-55). However, there was no testimony that petitioner 
had ever exhibited symptoms of organic brain syndrome or what 
relevance such a condition could have had in his case. In 
addition, Dr, Heinbecker recalled reviewing the results of some 
tests which had been administered to petitioner previously at the 
prison; however, the doctor did not recall what particular test 
results he reviewed (R. at 755). By inference, Dr. Heinbecker 
did not recall whether the test results which may have helped in 
diagnosing organic brain syndrome had been available for his 
review. 
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B. Appellate issue - failure to raise supplemental 
claims. 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association (LDA) represented 
petitioner at trial and, initially, on appeal. Curtis Nessett, 
who worked for LDA in 1985, prepared and filed petitioner's 
opening brief (R. at 813). He spoke with petitioner at least 
once, and possibly twice, about the issues to be raised on appeal 
(R. at 813 and 636). Mr. Nessett did not recall petitioner 
either objecting to any of the issues raised or asking for other 
issues to be included (R. at 813-14). 
Subsequently, in May or June of 1987, Joan Watt, also 
of LDA, became involved in preparation of the reply brief and in 
oral argument (R. at 779). Immediately prior to oral argument, 
petitioner filed an allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel with this Court and asked that LDA be removed from his 
case (R. at 781 and 638-39). After discussion between counsel 
and the Court, LDA was ordered to proceed with oral argument (R. 
at 781 and 640). Ms. Watt participated in oral argument, then 
oversaw a petition for rehearing and subsequent petition for writ 
of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court (R, at 781-82). 
Based on petitioner's allegation of ineffectiveness, this Court 
appointed Ed Brass to review and, if appropriate, file a 
supplemental appellate brief on the issue of ineffective trial 
counsel (R. at 782, 824 and 640-41). After consulting on the 
issue with other attorneys, none of which were with LDA, Mr. 
Brass filed a supplemental brief on that single issue (R. at 824 
and 641). According to petitioner, Mr. Brass told him that "it 
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wasn't an appropriate time . . . to file a brief on the 
ineffective assistance of counsel." (R. at 642).* No oral 
argument occurred on that supplemental issue (R. at 824). This 
Court did review the supplemental briefing on the claim of 
ineffective assistance. The claim based on a failure to object 
to the testimony of an officer, Dr. Heinbecker, and a member of 
the Board of Pardons was addressed and rejected for failure to 
demonstrate prejudice. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 288. 
"Defendant makes other allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. However, no record was made on which we can review 
them." Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Trial counsel was not ineffective on the basis of the 
use of Dr. Heinbecker's testimony. There is a strong presumption 
that counsel's last minute contact with Dr. Heinbecker was 
strategic. Even if it were not a strategic decision, the 
evidence demonstrates that counsel made every reasonable effort 
to find psychological experts who would help rather than harm 
petitioner's case. Finally, even if counsel's performance was 
deficient, the postconviction court erred in declaring counsel 
ineffective without requiring any showing of prejudice to 
petitioner arising from counsel's performance. Petitioner has 
shown no likelihood of a different result at trial had Dr. 
Heinbecker been given more time to evaluate petitioner. 
Evidently, that statement to petitioner was based on Mr. 
Brass's conclusion that no record had been developed in the trial 
court to support petitioner's allegations of ineffective counsel. 
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The court's decision on the issue of ineffective 
appellate counsel is also erroneous. The court apparently 
determined that appellate counsel's performance was deficient 
because he addressed only a limited issue in the supplemental 
brief he filed. Given that this Court directed the supplemental 
appellate counsel to address petitioner's ineffective trial 
counsel claim, it was not deficient performance for counsel to 
limit himself to that issue. Even if counsel's performance was 
deficient, petitioner has not established prejudice. The 
postconviction court addressed each of the issues petitioner 
claims should have been raised on appeal and, except for one, 
decided them adversely to petitioner. The one issue decided in 
petitioner's favor was that of the last minute contact with Dr. 
Heinbecker. As argued in Point I, there was no ineffective 
assistance displayed in the investigation and use of 
psychological testimony. Consequently, there can be no prejudice 
in counsel's failure to raise the issues in the original appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING POSTCONVICTION 
RELIEF ON THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL 
REGARDING THE USE OF DR. HEINBECKER. 
Although the court's decision is unclear, it appears 
that the court determined that trial counsel had provided 
ineffective assistance in the investigation and use of mental 
health experts in presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty 
hearing (R. at 509-10; see Addendum A), This Court has held that 
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ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
present a mixed question of fact and law. 
Therefore, in a situation where a trial court 
has previously heard a motion, based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewing 
courts are free to make an independent 
determination of a trial court's conclusions. 
The factual findings of the trial court, 
however, shall not be set aside on appeal 
unless clearly erroneous. 
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (footnotes 
omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984)). This Court has adopted a two-part test for determining 
ineffectiveness from Strickland. That test is: 
"First, the [petitioner] must show that 
counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the 'counsel' guaranteed the [petitioner] by 
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
[petitioner] must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were 
so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of 
a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable." 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
Petitioner has the burden of meeting both parts of the 
test. 
[I]n order to meet the first part of this 
test a [petitioner] must "identify the acts 
or omissions" which, under the circumstances, 
"show that counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." . . . The appellate court 
must . . . "indulge in the strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance; 
that is the [petitioner] must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, 
the challenged action 'might be considered 
sound trial strategy.'" 
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Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-
90). The standard for judging counsel's performance is that of 
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. 
Except in certain circumstances which are not alleged 
in this case, petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186, n.20. To prove prejudice, petitioner 
"must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 187 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
"[T]hese principles are not to be applied as a 
mechanical test." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
This Court 
"need not determine whether counsel's 
performance was deficient before examining 
the prejudice suffered by [petitioner] as a 
result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If 
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, 
that course should be followed." 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
A. Performance prong. 
In the present case, the district court violated these 
principles when it concluded that trial counsel had provided 
ineffective assistance in the area of mental health investigation 
and testimony. (R. at 509-10; see Addendum A). The court's 
finding that trial counsel's perfonnance in seeking and calling a 
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mental health expert is not supported by the evidence adduced at 
the evidentiary hearing. 
The evidence demonstrates that trial counsel expended 
every reasonable effort to find a psychological expert to testify 
on petitioner's behalf. Within five weeks of the crime, they had 
contacted Dr. Rindflesh and had him examine petitioner (R. 618, 
658 and at 774). The decision not to call him to testify at 
trial was sound trial strategy because his testimony would have 
been more harmful than helpful (R. at 758). Dr. Rindflesh told 
counsel that petitioner had no "significant psychiatric disorder" 
but "that textbooks are written about people like [petitioner], 
who basically have compulsive behavioral problems" (R. at 719-
20). Counsel's continuing search for helpful psychological 
testimony led them to review a psychological evaluation conducted 
at the prison by Dr. LaPray (R. at 660). They met with Dr. Agnes 
Plenk, who declined to be involved in the case (R. at 660-61 and 
797). They contacted another doctor, possibly Dr. Lebegue, who 
also declined to participate (R. at 662). Every expert they 
approached told them that petitioner exhibited "sociopath 
compulsive behavior" (R. at 662, 714-20 and 742). As counsel 
testified, "It wasn't a question of not calling [to find an 
expert]. It was a question of getting some kind of favorable 
diagnosis." (R. at 666). All the while, the contacts with 
experts were conducted in a way which would preclude the 
prosecution from learning about the evaluation results (R. at 
740-42 and 759). Again, this was sound trial strategy given the 
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unfavorable results counsel was getting from the experts (R. at 
740-42). 
After the repeated attempts to find anyone who would 
associate themselves with the case and would testify favorably 
failed, counsel found Dr. Heinbecker "late in the case" (R. at 
662). Dr. Heinbecker had just moved to Utah and he also was 
reluctant to become involved (R. at 721 and 714). Counsel had to 
overcome that reluctance before Dr. Heinbecker would even 
interview petitioner (R. at 714). Although Dr. Heinbecker would 
have expected and preferred to have more time to prepare to 
testify, counsel knew that a request for a continuance would have 
been futile (R. at 721). Dr. Heinbecker's evaluation was both 
favorable and unfavorable; however, given the unsuccessful 
attempts to find an expert who would testify positively for 
petitioner, counsel chose to call Dr. Heinbecker as a witness in 
the penalty hearing (R. at 666 and 713-14). 
The evidence reveals that petitioner's trial counsel 
made every reasonable effort to present psychological testimony. 
Some of the experts refused to associate with the case; others 
evaluated petitioner and had nothing favorable to testify to. 
Finally, counsel found a psychiatrist new to the state who, 
though reluctant, did evaluate petitioner and prepare to testify 
at the penalty phase. The rushed involvement of Dr. Heinbecker 
was not evidence of deficient performance by counsel; instead, it 
demonstrated counsel's continuing effort throughout trial to find 
favorable testimony. The fact that counsel was unable to obtain 
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expert testimony prior to that point was based on the refusal by 
the experts to participate or on unfavorable evaluations. It was 
not based on any lack of effort by counsel. 
B» Prejudice prong. 
Even if counsel's performance had been deficient, 
petitioner has not proven any prejudice based on his counsel's 
actions in seeking psychological experts. As in State v. Lovell, 
758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988), petitioner 
has made no effort to delineate any prejudice 
he suffered as the result of ineffectiveness 
of counsel. It is not enough to claim that 
the alleged ineffectiveness had some 
conceivable impact on the outcome of the 
trial. The claim may not be speculative, but 
must demonstrate a reality sufficient to 
overcome the strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised 
reasonable professional judgment. 
Id. at 913 (footnote omitted). At the evidentiary hearing, 
petitioner failed to demonstrate how trial counsel's largely 
unsuccessful attempts to find an expert who would testify 
positively for petitioner, which culminated in the late discovery 
of Dr. Heinbecker, prejudiced him. Petitioner did not present 
any evidence that there was any information that an expert could 
have produced, given more time, which would have changed the 
outcome of the sentencing hearing. 
At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner's counsel asked 
Dr. Heinbecker if he was familiar with the term "organic brain 
syndrome," and the methods used to determine whether a person has 
the syndrome (R. at 754-55). However, no attempt was made to 
explain this condition or how it applied to petitioner's case. 
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The district court ignored that lack of relevance in its decision 
when it agreed with petitioner that the "deprivation of adequate 
evaluations . . . prevented petitioner from presenting any 
evidence of possible organic brain damage or other mitigating 
information" (R. at 510). The court's analysis is totally 
speculative. There is no evidence in the record that organic 
brain syndrome or other mitigating information exists; in fact, 
the evidence shows that Dr. Rindflesh told trial counsel that 
petitioner suffered from "no significant psychiatric disorders" 
(R. at 719). There is no evidence before this Court supporting 
the district court's speculation that more time or testing might 
have revealed some mitigating evidence for the penalty hearing. 
The district court's conclusion that counsel was ineffective 
based on this speculation is erroneous. State v. Lovell, 758 
P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING POSTCONVICTION 
RELIEF ON THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE APPELLATE 
COUNSEL. 
The court also granted postconviction relief on the 
claim of ineffective appellate counsel. The same standard of 
review and standard for determining the effectiveness of counsel 
addressed in the previous point apply here. 
After the opening brief was filed by LDA, petitioner 
filed a pro se document with this Court which alleged ineffective 
assistance by trial counsel (R. at 780 and 636-39). This Court 
appointed Ed Brass as supplemental counsel to address the claim 
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of ineffective assistance (R. at 640 and 821). After 
consultation with other attorneys (not associated with LDA), Mr. 
Brass filed a supplemental brief which stated that petitioner's 
claims were mostly premature because there was no record support 
for them at trial (R. at 642 and 825). 
A. Performance prong. 
Mr. Brass was appointed by this Court shortly before 
oral argument to address petitioner's claim that his trial 
counsel had provided ineffective assistance. After an 
independent review of the specific claims raised by petitioner, 
Mr. Brass concluded that no record support had been established 
for most of those claims; consequently, it would be premature, 
and ineffectual, to raise them at that point (R. at 642 and 825). 
This Court addressed the supplemental claim and rejected it for 
failure to establish prejudice on certain allegations and failure 
to provide record support for the other allegations. State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 288 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 
1090 (1990). 
In the postconviction proceeding, the district court 
was troubled by the fact that LDA remained on the case after Mr. 
Brass was appointed; however, that apparently was the direction 
received from this Court. Just before oral argument, petitioner 
filed a requ€*st for new counsel; LDA was ordered to continue with 
oral argument on the appellate issues raised in its opening brief 
(R. at 781 and 789-90). Mr. Brass subsequently filed his 
supplemental brief regarding the ineffectiveness claim (R. at 
•16-
782). After this Court's decision on the initial appeal, LDA 
prepared a petition for rehearing and a subsequent petition for 
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court (R. at 781-
82). LDA did not file those petitions; instead, they were sent 
to Mr. Brass who reviewed and approved them for filing (R. at 
827). Given the status of the case at that point, this did not 
constitute a failure to independently assess the merits of 
petitioner's case. This Court's opinion on petitioner's direct 
appeal dealt almost exclusively with the issues raised in LDA's 
opening brief; the claims of ineffective trial counsel had 
summarily been disposed of on the prejudice prong of Strickland 
and on the basis of lack of record to support most of the claims. 
At the time of the petition for rehearing and petition for writ 
of certiorari, there still was little or no record support for 
the ineffectiveness claim• 
The district court apparently misconstrues the purpose 
for which Mr. Brass was appointed. He was directed to address 
petitioner's supplemental claim of ineffective assistance by 
trial counsel; he was not directed to search for other possible 
appealable issues (R. at 821-22). Mr. Brass followed the mandate 
from this Court; the fact that he did not go beyond it does not 
demonstrate that his performance was deficient. 
B. Prejudice prong. 
The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus on 
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal because 
the court found that supplemental counsel had not conducted an 
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independent investigation of appealable issues and researched and 
prepared independent appellate documents (R. at 515; see Addendum 
B). However, the court then stated: 
Petitioner's other issues which he claims 
he was unable to address on appeal have 
already been dealt with in this decision, and 
therefore need not be addressed any further. 
(R. at 515). In other words, all of the issues petitioner claims 
independent appellate counsel should have raised on direct appeal 
were raised in this proceeding2 and all but one were decided 
adversely to petitioner. The one on which petitioner prevailed 
was the issue of ineffectiveness for failure to obtain a 
psychological expert earlier in petitioner's trial. That issue 
was addressed in Point I and, as argued there, the court erred in 
granting the writ on that point. Since petitioner cannot prevail 
on any of the issues which he claims should have been raised in 
the original appeal, and which he raised in the habeas corpus 
proceeding, there is no prejudice in appellate counsel's failure 
to raise them. Since there is no prejudice, the court erred in 
holding that appellate counsel had provided ineffective 
assistance. 
2The postconviction proceeding provided petitioner the 
opportunity to create the record support for his claims that was 
lacking on direct appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the decision of the trial court and deny 
plaintiff's petition for postconviction relief. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q3&* day of July, 
1992. 
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Court rules though there may be some evidence of a conflict and 
as a result, some deficiency in representation, because of the 
weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt, there is 
no prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt* 
E- Penalty phase 
First claim: There was insufficient presentation of 
evidence in mitigation. That "Effective representation of the 
accused in a capital case demands that counsel challenge the 
State's aggravating evidence and present a cohesive and 
understandable theory of mitigation.11 Petitioner contends this 
was not done. Primarily, there was inadequate investigation 
relating to petitioner's mental health prior to trial. 
Whatever evidence was presented was inadequate — too little 
and too late. There is dispute regarding Dr. Peter 
Heinbecker's testimony. Was there sufficient time and 
sufficient medical or psychological evaluations for Dr. 
Heinbecker to adequately and completely testify in behalf of 
petitioner? The Court is of the opinion there was not. Dr. 
Heinbecker was contacted a mere 24 hours before he testified. 
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During that time he "was able only to examine some of the 
records, interview Mr. Gardner for about one hour, and talk to 
his mother and brother for a total of 2.5 hours." Further, 
"Dr. Heinbecker testified that, in a case of this significance, 
he would have expected more time to prepare his evaluation." 
(Opening Brief, p. 26). 
Dr. Mark Rindflesh, a psychiatrist, evaluated petitioner in 
May 1985. He apparently was not asked to testify for 
petitioner (Opening Brief, p. 28). Dr. Agnes Plenk was asked 
to evaluate or testify in behalf of petitioner, but she 
declined. No further effort was made to seek professional 
assistance for petitioner, nor seek State assistance in doing 
so. In addition, present counsel's efforts to secure expert 
testimony for petitioner's evaluation was opposed by the State 
and sustained by this Court. As a result, no satisfactory 
mental health evaluation of petitioner has ever been available 
to petitioner to present at any hearing. 
Petitioner contends the deprivation of adequate evaluations 
has prevented petitioner from presenting any evidence of 
possible organic brain damage or other mitigating information 
which further prevented presentation of "a cohesive and 
understandable theory of mitigation." The Court agrees. 
ADDENDUM B 
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paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), and they are, therefore, denied 
on their merits. 
(I) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL 
Based on Mr. Ed Brass's testimony and the submitted briefs, 
this Court is of the opinion there was no conflict of interest 
by Mr. Brass having previously represented Carma Hainsworth and 
having subsequently represented petitioner. The Court has 
considered the matter of identification of the person who 
handed petitioner the gun, and the effect on the jury which 
directly involves Mr. Brass' client, Carma Hainsworth. 
Although not brought to the Supreme Court's attention, nor a 
record made of this, nor waiver received from petitioner, the 
Court is of the opinion Mr. Brass had analyzed the situation 
and determined there was no conflict and the Court agrees with 
his analyses. 
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention there exists 
a conflict of interest on direct appeal from the trial court, 
as well as ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal from the 
trial court to the Supreme Court. Neither Mr. Brass, or 
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appellate counsel Ms. Watt, were at fault, but a victim of 
circumstances. 
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that unusual 
circumstances existed to excuse the failure of petitioner to 
raise issues on appeal. 
Mr. Ed Brass was appointed to replace the Salt 
Lake Legal Defenders Association based on 
petitioner's claim he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial and on direct 
appeal. Mr. Brass filed a supplemental brief 
arguing there was no evidentiary record to frame 
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In addition, it is not contested that Mr. Brass 
was appointed by the Supreme Court's order, a 
copy of which order he claims not to have 
received, to file a supplemental brief to address 
matters not previously addressed. Consequently, 
based on a telephone conversation with Chief 
Justice Hall, he understood he was appointed only 
to address the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial. Mr. Brass claims to not have 
received a copy of its opinion. 
A further problem exists. 
The Supreme Court's order discharging the Salt 
Lake County Legal Defenders Association was not 
scrupulously honored. Attorney Joan Watt 
testified she was instructed in an informal 
telephone call from the Supreme Court's clerk to 
file the appropriate documents in Mr. Gardner's 
behalf after the decision affirming his 
conviction and sentence was announced. Although 
the Supreme Court had decided that he was 
entitled to independent counsel on the 
ineffective assistance issue, Ms. Watt also 
prepared the Supplemental Petition for Rehearing 
and Supplemental Reply to State's Response to 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, which were 
signed and filed by Mr. Brass. 
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Based on Mr. Brass' understanding, he was appointed to 
represent petitioner on the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial and, further, appellate pleadings were 
prepared by the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, but 
signed by Mr. Brass, even though the Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association had previously been discharged in representing 
petitioner. This Court is of the opinion petitioner received 
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because all 
appealable issues were not addressed and there is a question of 
whether issues appealed were properly addressed by independent 
counsel because pleadings were prepared by the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association which had previously been discharged on 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. 
The Court grants petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus on the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
Petitioner should have the opportunity to appeal all issues to 
the Utah State Supreme Court by independent counsel on all 
issues based on independent counsel's own investigation of 
appealable issues and based on independent counsel's own 
research and preparation of appellate documents. 
Petitioner's other issues which he claims he was unable to 
address on appeal have already been dealt with in this 
decision, and therefore need not be addressed any further. 
